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SOME RECENT OPINIONS ON PROFIT SHARING AS A TEST OF
PARTNERSHIP. It is astonishing to find intelligent judges resting
satisfied with the vague and unscientific statements of what consti-
tutes a partnership solemnly made by less intelligent judges and
text writers. Take, for example, the opinion of Burgess, J., in
Afackie v. Mott, 47 S. W. 897 (Supreme Court of Missouri). The
court had before it a beautiful case in which to apply the common
law principle that only those are partners who are co-proprietors in
business, and its corollary that the inference will be against part-
nership where the facts are consistent with any other relation.
The persons alleged to be partners were, in fact, an owner of land
and a building contractor, and all the phenomena were consistent
with the hypothesis that the owner had tempted the contractor to
take up and complete an abandoned building scheme by offering
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him a share in the ultimate profits. The court rightly decided that
here was no partnership; but one searches the opinion in vain for
a clear-cut and intelligible statement of what a partnership is.
Theophilus Parsons is quoted to the effect that the question
"must generally, and perhaps always, be determined by the inten-
tion of the parties." If by this is meant that the parties are part-
ners if they have manifested an intention to become co-proprietors
of a common business, each having all the powers and privileges
that mark an owner, it is a sound but blind statement of. the com-
mon law. If (as is more likely) it means that an "intention to.
become partners" is material to the solution of the problem, it
may be disposed of by a reference to the lucid judgment of Sir
George Jessel in Pooley v. Driver, 5 Ch. D. 458 (x876). Har-
rison, C. J., in Gates v. Johnson, 77 N. W. 407, is apparently
satisfied with the familiar and well-nigh meaningless phrase to the
effect that partnership exists where there is "a community of in-
terest in a business enterprise and in. the profits thereof." In
pleasing contrast to these views is the recognition given by
Temple, J., to Cox v. Hickman, 8 H. L. C. 268 (1868), and
Eastman v. Clark, 53 N. H. 276 (1876), and the true theory of
partnership which those cases expound; Coard v. Clanton, $5 Pac.
147. He denies that the California Code makes profit sharing the
test of partnership. He observes that the code definition -would
not lack much of a good definition of a partnership if the clause
in regard to a division of profits were omitted. It would read:
"Partnership is the association of two or more persons for the
purpose of carrying on business together." He is right. Insert
the words "as co-propiietors" after the word "persons," and the
definition accurately describes the relation. Failure to grasp the full
significance of this test has just led the Supreme Court of North
Carolina (Webb v. Hicks, 31 S. E. 479) to render a decision,
which appears, though the report of the facts is meagre, to declare
that a partnership exists upon the same state of facts which was
held in Cox v. Hickman not to constitute the relation. Creditors
of an insolvent arranged with the assignee to run the business in
order to work out their debts. Obviously this is not a case of as-
sociation for the purpose of business, but co-operation in saving
planks from the wreck. Compare Kilshaw v. Jukes, 3 B. & S. 847
(1863). The North Carolina court does not even cite Cox v.
Hickman, nor does it refer to the well-known New Jersey case of
Brundred v. Afuzzy, 25 N. J. Law, 268; Id. 674 (1857), which
would have been directly in point. A much more satisfactory
opinion is that of Dixon, J., in Austin v. Neil, 41 Atl. 834, in
which case the Supreme Court of New Jersey applies the test of
principalship or proprietorship, and reaches the conclusion that
the real relation between the persons alleged to be partners was
that of lessor and lessee.
NOTES.
OLEOMARGARINE ; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE LAWS REGU-
LATING ITS MANUFACTURE AND SALE In recent years a number of
states have attempted to prohibit the sale of oleomargarine within
their borders. Owing to the vast amount of capital invested in
the manufacture of this substance, as opposed to the wealthy dairy
interests, which are inimical, as a matter of course, to its use by
the public, the statutes upon this subject have been bitterly con-
tested, and there is no slight probability of a further development
of this question by the courts. The latest decision upon it is the
case of W nght v. State, 41 Atl. 795 (Nov. 17, 1898), in which
the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the constitutionality of
the statute of that state set forth below.
The following statutes have been attacked as violating provisions
of the Constitution of the United States :
Maryland Act of Assembly, Cod. Publ. Laws, Art. 27, Sec. 88
(z888): "No person shall manufacture out of any oleaginous sub-
stance other than that produced from unadulterated milk, or of
cream from the same, . . . any article designed to take the
place of butter or cheese, . .. . or shall sell or offer the same for
sale as an article of food." Section 89 prohibits the manufacture
or sale of such article, "whether such aricle is made or produced
in this state or elsewhere."
Pennsylvania Act of Assembly, May 21, 1885, P. L. 22, was
substantially similar to the Maryland Act, except that the clause in
italics was omitted.
Massachusetts Statutes, x891, c. 58, p. 695, prohibited the sale
of the aforesaid "article in imitation or butter. . . . "Pro-
vided, that nothing in this act shall be construed to prohibit the
manufacture and sale of oleomargarine in a separate and distinct
form, and in such manner as shall advise the consumer of its real
character, free from coloration or ingredient that causes it to look
like butter."
New Hampshire Publ. Stat., 1891, c. 127, § 19, prohibited the
sale of oleomargarine, "unless the same is contained in tubs,
firkins, etc., marked 'oleomargarine,' . . . and, if it is a sub-
stitute for butter, unless it is of a piink color."
The three last statutes have been brought before the Supreme
Court of the United States on the ground that they were in conflict
with the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause. In
Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678 (1888), defendant was
indicted for selling in Pennsylvania a package of oleomargarine
manufactured in that state. The Supreme Court affirmed the de-
cision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, holding that, as to
oleomargarine manufactured within the state, the Act of i885 was
a valid exercise of the police power, and not in conflict with the
Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Gray lissented, and the closing
words of his opinion are significant: "The prohibition of sale in
any way, or for any use, is quite a different thing from a regulation
of the sale or use so as to protect the health and morals of the
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community. The fault which I find with the opinion of the court
on this head is that it ignores the distinction between regulation
and prohibition."
Next in order the Massachusetts statute was called into question.
In Plumley v. Afassachusefis, 155 U. S. 493 (1894), defendant was
indicted for selling in Massachusetts an original package of oleo-
margarine manufactured in Illinois. The court held that, even
though the law acted on a subject of interstate commerce, yet its
plain effect was merely the prevention of deception and- fraud on
the public, and it was, therefore, valid under the police power.*
Fuller, C. J., Field and Brewer, JJ., dissented on the ground that
the statute prevented the sale of oleomargarine when of a color
similar to butter, even though there might have been no intention
on the part of the seller to deceive the public into the belief that
it was butter. "I deny that a state may exclude from commerce
legitimate subjects of commercial dealings because of the possi-
bility that their appearance may deceive purchasers in regard to
their qualities." (Per Fuller, diss.).
Last year the Pennsylvania and New Hampshire statutes came
before the court, this time the question of interstate commerce
being involved in their application. In Sdwllenberger v. Pennsyl-
vania, i8 Sup. Ct. 757 (x898), the Supreme Court of the United
States held the Pennsylvania statute void as a regulation of-inter-
state commerce when it acted upon original packages of oleomar-
garine brought from other states. The opinion of the court,
delivered by Justice Peckham, is a work of exceptional learning
and ability. After considering the nature and history of oleomar-
garine, he comes to the conclusion that, within the past quarter of
a century, oleomargarine has ceased to be a "newly discovered
product," which a state legislature might well prohibit on the
ground that it might be dangerous to the public, but that it is a
"perfectly healthful commodity" and a "nutritious article of
food." Therefore, the state may not prohibit the introduction of
the said nutritious food within her borders ; and it is useless for
her legislature to declare that the health of the inhabitants may
be harmed thereby, since the question as to the nature and effect of
oleomargarine is to be decided by the court and not by the legis-
lature. From this decision Justices Gray and Harlan emphatically
dissented. They denied that even at this date a. court has power
to say that, as regards a substance of the nature of oleomargarine,
the legislature has erred when it solemnly declares its introduction
into the state to be a danger to the health of the community, and
the statute to be necessary to protect the people from being induced
to purchase articles either not fit for food, or differing in nature
from what they purport to be; but that "the questions of danger
to health, and of likelihood of fraud or deception, and of the pre-
ventitive measures required for the protection of the people, are
questions of fact and of public policy, the determination of which
belongs to the legislative department and not to the judiciary."
NOTES.
At the same session of the court the New Hampshire statute was
declared unconstitutional: Collins v. New Hampishire, x8 Sup. Ct.
768-(1898), Gray and Harlan, JJ., dissenting. Justice Peckham,
in delivering the opinion of the court, said that, if a legislature
had power to cause oleomargarine to be colored pink, they could
order it to be colored in such a repulsive manner and mixed
with substances so offensive to the senses that, although it might
not be deleterious to the health, the public would be effectually re-
strained from purchasing it; therefore the statute was as bad as the
one which the court had just declared void in Schollenberger v.
Pennsylvania.
The question naturally arises whether, in the cases of Schollen-
berger v. Pennsylvania and Collins v. New Hampshire, the Supreme
Court does not overrule its decisions in Powell v. Pennsylvania
and Plumley v. Massachusetts. Justice Peckham says that it does
not; Justice Gray says that it does. Certainly, it would seem that,
at the very least, the court has taken a new position on the sub-
ject. According to the position of the majority in Schollenberger
v. Pennsylvania, oleomargarine, when properly manufactured, is a
healthful and nutritious article of food and a well-known and
harmless commodity. Now, it is very proper to say that such an
article may not be excluded by a state from interstate commerce,
or its interstate transportation even regulated; but it is quite con-
sistent for the court so say, in the same breath, that the legislature
of Pennsylvania may utterly prohibit the manufacture and sale of
this healthful food product within the state? Yet this was so ad-
judged in Powell v. Pennsylvania, for the Pennsylvania statute
prohibited the sale of oleomargarine without any exceptions what-
ever, and it was admitted in that case that the purchaser was fully
aware of what he was buying. If the premise adopted by the ma-
jority in Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania is correct, the conclusion
is irresistible that the rights of the inhabitants of Pennsylvania to
manufacture and sell this "healthy food product" are secured
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
To return to the Maryland case, Might v. State, 41 Atl. 795, it
would seem that, under Powell v. Pennsylvania, the case was cor-
rectly decided, since its facts did not admit of the application of
the commerce clause, the transaction being confined to oleomarga-
rine manufactured and sold within the State of Maryland. If,
however, defendant should take an appeal to the Supreme Court of
the United States, there is, at least, a possibility that he would be
able to secure a reversal.
